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T
omorrow, the world could face a pandemic. It could
be due to H5N1 avian inﬂuenza—experts warn that it
is just a matter of time—or a different inﬂuenza
strain, an unknown pathogen, or a bioterrorist attack. In all
cases, biological scientists face the challenge of characterizing
the pathogen and determining how to control it. Their
scientiﬁc judgments and public statements will shape the
global pandemic response. During the SARS outbreak in
2003, scientists generated information that inﬂuenced
everything from medical treatments to travel restrictions,
trade policy, and political decisions. Given the importance of
getting scientiﬁc information out into the world, scientists
should consider now how they will respond and communicate
in the setting of the next pandemic.
In hopes of sparking that discussion, the Center for
Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
organized an International Conference on Biosafety and
Biorisks (http://upmc-biosecurity.org/pages/events/biosafety/
report.html) in collaboration with the World Health
Organization (WHO) Communicable Disease Surveillance
and Response Ofﬁce in 2005. More than 150 scientists and
public health practitioners from 25 countries gathered in
Lyon, France, to hear speakers from the WHO, the European
Commission, scientiﬁc journals, Interpol, and public health
networks—many of the institutions and individuals who will
likely play key roles in the global response to the next
pandemic. By discussing the biosafety and biosecurity
challenges presented by past epidemics such as SARS,
participants recognized the importance of scientiﬁc and
public health collaboration in combating disease—and the
need to plan.
Each epidemic is different, and will have its own scientiﬁc
and political dimensions that make planning difﬁcult.
However, based on past epidemics, there are some likely
patterns. Researchers will need to share biological samples
between laboratories, sometimes internationally; decision
makers and journalists will want the latest information, which
may not be peer reviewed; and researchers will risk
contracting the disease they research, which could then spread
outside of the laboratory. Scientists need to harmonize and
modernize standards and training in these areas, to help make
their response to a pandemic prompt, accurate, and safe.
Access to Biological and Clinical Samples
Scientists need access to samples from patients and
laboratories in order to conduct research and public health
surveillance, as well as to develop diagnostic tests. Not every
researcher who requests a strain for research in the midst of a
pandemic is likely to get it, but international standards for
documenting, referencing, tracking, and shipping samples
would save valuable time in a pandemic.
For example, during the SARS outbreak in 2003,
laboratories with access to samples were not always willing to
share with other, potentially competing, laboratories.
Shipping samples was also a problem. In one report, ‘‘It took
eight weeks to determine the protease structure [of the SARS
coronavirus]. But half that time was taken in obtaining the
DNA for the viral proteins from collaborators...and getting it
through customs’’ [1]. Sharing samples can be difﬁcult even
within the same research institution. Many clinical
laboratories cannot release patient samples without
preapproved protocols from an Institutional Review Board.
Universities should consider how to make it easier for their
researchers to comply with Institutional Review Board
regulations [2], including developing emergency Institutional
Review Board protocols.
H5N1-sample access problems have already begun due to
slow responses for shipping samples to international
reference laboratories. Noted virologists from universities
outside of the WHO laboratory network have also had
difﬁculty getting access to samples and thus contributing
their expertise [3]. Bioterrorism concerns have added to the
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handling highly pathogenic viruses, including H5N1 [3]. In
the US, H5N1 is a select agent, so the Department of
Agriculture must certify laboratories before they can receive
the virus [4]. However, improved standards for tracking
samples, if correctly applied, could bring beneﬁts to
biosecurity and also help researchers. According to a WHO
ofﬁcial, ‘‘During the [SARS] outbreaks, lots of samples were
taken...and we don’t know where they all are’’ [5]. SARS may
no longer be infecting people naturally, but there is risk that
a laboratory sample could end up in improperly trained or
malevolent hands. H5N1 could be similarly dangerous. In a
time when one can track a package from warehouse to
mailbox, the current methods for keeping track of vital
biological samples are grossly out of date.
Standards for Communication of Scientific Results
Scientists, journal editorial boards, and other scientiﬁc
professional organizations should consider creating
standards for communicating scientiﬁc results, so decision
makers can make use of the information and scientists can get
professional recognition for their work. Traditionally,
scientists communicate results through conferences and
peer-reviewed publications. However, during the SARS
epidemic, it became common to announce results in a press
conference. Sharing results with the press may save time, but
there are problems with this approach: the reports are not
peer reviewed and newspapers do not usually give in-depth
technical reports of experimental results, which limit the
usefulness of news reports to researchers.
Publication in scientiﬁc journals also poses problems.
While journals provide peer review and professional
recognition for the authors, publication is often slow. In the
absence of hard data, some reporters cover the reactions of
people who have seen papers under review—for example,
‘‘Researchers who have seen [the] data say they are
convinced’’ [6]—rather than the facts themselves. One way to
speed dissemination of results is for scientiﬁc journals to
agree to peer review articles of importance within 24 hours,
before Web posting. Reviewers should also have strict
deadlines so that they do not delay important information
being made public.
Biosafety Standards
Accidents happen, and working with infectious agents will
never be risk free. However, a lack of training, mentoring,
and formal standards for biosafety leaves researchers at
unnecessary risk of infection, and has had tragic effects
outside of the laboratory. There are no international
standards for biosafety, but there are guidelines from the
WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
that could be developed into formal training for all
researchers.
The consequences of not adhering to laboratory biosafety
guidelines can be dire. Some experts believe that the
dominant strain of ﬂu in 1977 originated from a laboratory
[7]. During the SARS outbreak, there were four documented
laboratory accidents in three laboratories— Singapore,
Taiwan, and China [8]. In each case, the laboratories had the
best equipment, but training and experience with pathogens
were lacking. The public may not easily forgive the scientiﬁc
community at large for an epidemic that starts in a
laboratory. The scientiﬁc community has a responsibility to
take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents and to train
researchers in safety. Accidents should be documented, and
the lessons learned from those accidents should be
incorporated into safety training. If scientists do not promote
biosafety, regulations could be imposed on them. The strict
safety regulations proposed for laboratories in Boston, for
example, directly result from three laboratory-acquired cases
of tularemia [9].
Global Public Health Relies on Networks
In the event of an avian ﬂu pandemic, it is likely that the
WHO will coordinate the international response, as they
did with SARS. However, no one organization has the
resources and expertise to deal with all of the scientiﬁc and
medical complexities that a pandemic will present. The
WHO relies on a variety of information networks and
laboratories, such as the Global Public Health Intelligence
Network, which gathers reports of disease outbreaks in
seven languages, and proMED-mail, which is an open-source
electronic reporting system for disease outbreaks. A similar
set of open-source electronic systems for scientists to
convey information and collaborate could also amplify
WHO scientiﬁc expertise and the availability of hard data
for decision making in a pandemic.
Starting to Plan
Scientiﬁc information fuels and directs the response to
epidemics. Public health professionals, clinicians, politicians,
journalists, and members of the public will make critical
decisions based on what is known about a disease as an
outbreak unfolds. Scientists can take this opportunity, before
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those who need it as fast and as safely as possible. “
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